Fasting : relevance of time and place in religious interpretation”


SHAFAQNA – By Shaik Mushtaq Al-Khaghani, translated by Al-Mahdi Institue (AMI).

To begin with, we must point to the fact that this discussion is investigative, and not legislative, and it is the summary of a new approach that the religious authority, Sayyid Kamal al-Haydari is working on at present.

Contemporary religious reality is facing a lot of challenges at the moment, and the reasons for that go back to the tremendous leap in information on all levels and across various dimensions. Modernity and contemporary advances have, therefore, singled out several problems that reality has assumed hitherto, the most important of them being to do with religion, and specifically Islamic Shari’a. Today’s question, therefore: Is Islamic theory suitable for application in every time and place or is it a theory specific to a particular region in a specifc time?

In order to answer such questions, the religious texts, namely the Holy Qur’an and the purified prophetic practice must be read objectively and not subjectively, as religion is a complete legislative system as one multi-dimensional body. And this can only be accomplished by mujtahids (jurists) who undertake the process of juristic investigation in all spheres of religious knowledge, not merely issues of permissible and prohibited. They would carry this out by taking into consideration the relevance of time and place in the process of derivation of legal rulings.

Imam Khomeini (ra) explains this prevalent view of juristic investigation as follows:

‘I believe in the system of jurisprudence concurrent among our jurists, and in ijtihad in its essential model, and this is something that is mandatory. However, this does not mean that Islamic jurisprudence should not advance with the requirements of the day. In fact, the elements of time and place do have an effect on ijtihad, in that a certain reality may have a certain ruling in place, but another ruling may be applicable in light of principles that govern society with its various policies and economics.’

(Imam Khomeini, Sahifa al-Noor, v.21, p.98)

Allama Hilli (648-726 AH) in his discussion on the possibility of abrogation says:

‘Rulings are subject to utilitarian outcomes, and utilitarian outcomes change according to changes in the times, and differ with the differences in followers of those rulings. So it’s possible for a specific ruling to be beneficial for a people in a particular time, and hence enforceable, but detrimental to another people in another time, and hence prohibited.’

(Kashf al-Murad, Mu’assasat al-Imam al-Sadiq; p.173)

Similarly, Ibn al-Qayyim al-Jawziyya (d.751 AH) said in his book I’lam al-Muqi’in, in a section entitled ‘Changes and differences in the legal ruling according to changes in times, places, assets, intentions and customs’. He says in his introduction:

‘This is an extremely useful section, and due to the neglect of it, a very big error has occurred in Shari’a that has engendered hardship, constriction and unjustified imposition of legal injuctions. It is not even known that the sublime Shari’a, which only has the greatest of benefits has not prescribed these, for the principles and bases of the Shari’a are founded on wise decrees and benefits for the servants in both their daily living as well as their Hereafter. The whole thing is a system of equilibrium, mercy, benefit, and wisdom, so any matter that detracts away from equilibrium to duress, from mercy to the opposite thereof, from benefit to detriment, and from wisdom to futility is not part of Shari’a.’

(I’lam al-Muqi’in. v.3, p.11)

All of this does not mean that we come out with new rulings and include them as part of Shari’a, or that we go about chopping and changing juristic rulings, but the point of this theory can be stated as being based on the belief that legal rulings change in accordance with the change in subject matters upon which these legal rulings have been based. So time and place are essential and all-important elements in the juristic investigation (ijtihad), without having to transgress established constants of legislation or change rulings haphazardly according to whims, necessities, arbitrary or short-term utilitarian outcomes.

This theory brings a new approach to the methodology of deriving legal rulings, and necessitates a very big and important duty on the part of jurists to open themselves up to societal reality, in order that they may familiarise themselves with it and grasp it fully. Then they can apply juristic principles to it (phase of application), so that this does not remain a mere theory, far-removed from the actualities of daily life that society experiences.

In order to discuss the relevance of time and place in our understanding of religion, and how best to make it applicable in every time and place, we present this research which we have gleaned from the lessons and research conducted by his eminence the religious authority, Sayyid Kamal al-Hayderi, may he live long.


Time and place plays an important role in the development of Shari’a, evidenced by the fact that humans have evolved through various stages, and the legal rulings pertaining to them have changed alongside them (“We have assigned a law and a path to each of you” (5:48)). So with regards to time and place, divine scripture in general has taken into account the varying conditions that humans experience throughout the actualities of time and place, and it legislates a code of conduct that is suitable to the situations prevalent in that particular time.

As far as Islamic Shari’a goes, given that it is the final one, it must necessarily be the most complete and most comprehensive, so that it is suitable for every time and place, until Allah inherits the earth and its people. The noble Qur’an elucidates all things, through His words, exalted be His name: “We have sent the Scripture down to you explaining everything, and as guidance and mercy and good news to those who devote themselves to God” (16:89). What is meant by ‘elucidation’ and ‘explanation’ here, is that both dogmatic as well as legislative details have been clarified by the Noble Messenger (S), as well as His Household (A), being the inheritors of his knowledge. This divine responsibility accorded to them has been outlined by the Qur’an itself, where Allah says: “We have sent down the message to you too [Prophet], so that you can explain to people what was sent for them, so that they may reflect.” (16:44).

Imam al-Baqir, peace be upon him, has said: ‘For every single thing, there is a mention in either the Book or the Sunnah.’[1] In other words, the practical responsibility of the noble Sunnah – which is the body of narrations about the sayings, deeds and tacit approvals of the Prophet of Islam Muhammad ibn Abdullah (S) and the infallibles after him – is to detail that which the Qur’an has summarized, to define that which it has left undefined, and to specify that which it has generalized.

However, if we take into consideration the factor of time in legislation, and the tremendous leap in information, scientific advances and discoveries that we are experiencing across different cultures, certain challenges emerge on the back of all these, urging the Muslim to question and inquire: Does religion have the ability to interact and advance along with modernity and contemporary life or not?

In answer to these queries, our teacher Sayyid al-Hayderi is of the opinion that Islam is able to keep up with life in all its facets, and in fact it has the power to lead humanity in accordance with Allah’s will, as it is a complete system with various infinite dimensions, but coupled with terms and conditions, and a jurist well-acquainted with his own time period is one of these conditions. So it is the knowledge of time and place that can lead us to the correct reading of religious texts, both dogmatic and pragmatic.

Again, this does mean making the text comply with the requirements of a particular era, but in actual fact, necessitates a much closer investigation into the various facets of the text with the inclusion of time and place therein. Therefore, the circumstances related to the origin of the religious text must be taken into consideration, and it cannot be removed and taken in isolation of the actual time for which it was prescribed.

He says regarding this:

‘Perhaps this abstraction of the text and taking it in isolation from the factors that may have been relevant to the understanding of it, can be considered one of the most important postulates and juristic frameworks that not a single one of our ancient as well as pre-modern scholars have objected to. And in fact there has been a decisive unanimity among all the jurists of our creed, regardless of their usuli and juristic leanings and foundations, that the basic principles underlying the treatment of these texts was the irrelevance of these premises of the time and place in which a certain text was prescribed. The evidence for this statement is that we cannot find a single jurist who has attempted to understand these texts that have come down to us from the Prophet and the purified Imams, in light of their societal contexts and their economic circumstances. For this reason, no jurist takes into account the effect of time and place in his understanding of the legal text, and this is where we find them coming across contradictions between a text that originated in the first century and another text that originated in the third century, for example. They do not take into consideration the huge development that was taking place in social and economic living, the relations that were forming between people, not to mention the great ideological developments that Islamic society was undergoing as a result of the infiltration of various ideological, philosophical and social systems therein. Rather than merely conclude the existence of contradictions between them, it was necessary to go back to the contexts of time and place surrounding that text. In that instance, if congruence in contexts and conditions (of both texts) is established, then only can a contradiction between them be concluded, otherwise not.

So the fact of the matter is that taking these texts in isolation of the time and place in which they originated, without admitting the peculiarities of the contexts in which they were prescribed, and removing them from the factors that may well have influenced them, and instead generalizing them, can be considered one of the most important postulates and juristic presumptions that continue to govern the science of usul al-fiqh until today. This holds true in spite of all the changes and essential developments that both fiqh and usul have gone through, and in spite of the various phases and great headway that has been made to get them to where they are at present.’[2]

Legal Proofs:

Al-ʿAyyāshī’s narration on the authority of Imam al-Ṣādiq (A), that he said: ‘The Qur’an is alive and will never die; it runs its course as do the night and the day, and the sun and the moon, and it applies to those who will come after us just as it applied to those who preceded us.’[3]

Imam al-Ṣādiq (A) also said, ‘Allah’s Book contains accounts about those who preceded you, news of what is yet to come after you, and the laws of everything you have before you, and we have knowledge of it.’[4]

They are the ones who commanded their companions to deduce legal rulings, as has been narrated on the authority of Ahmad ibn Muhammad ibn Abu Nasr, on the authorit of Imam Rida (A), who said, ‘Upon us is the delivery of the principles, and upon you is the deduction.’[5]

Some of the narrations discuss about the change in certain rulings occurring as a result of the change in currency depending on the monetary circulation of the time:

-On the authority of al-Hakam ibn Utayba, on the authority of Abu ja’far (A); ‘I asked him: How is it that in the past the compensation (for murder) payment used to be camels, cows and sheep?’ He replied, ‘That was only the case among bedouins in pre-Islamic times. When Islam emerged and cash became the prevalent currency among people, Amir al-Mu’minin (A) determined it in cash.’ Hakam asked, ‘So what would a bedouin today have to pay compensation in – camels or cash?’ So he replied, ‘Camels today are like cash, and in fact even more valuable as compensation. The compensation for an accidental murder used to be valued at 100 camels, each camel being worth 100 dirhams, making 10 thousand dirhams in total.’ He said, ‘How old should these 100 camels be?’ He replied, ‘About a year old.’[6]

Other narrations looked at conventional practice in determining clothing.

-On the authority of Hammad ibn Uthman, who said, ‘I was in the presence of Abu Abdullah al-Sadiq (A) when a man asked him, ‘May Allah do you good. You have mentioned previously that Ali ibn Abi Talib used to wear coarse clothing, and a shirt that cost no more than 4 dirhams, etc. but we see you wearing new clothing.’ So he said, ‘Ali ibn Abi Talib used to wear that in a time when he would not have been reproached for it, and if he was to wear that today, he would be notorious as a result of it. So the best clothing for every time period is the clothing of the people of that time. Having said that, the Qa’im of the Household of the Prophet, when he rises, will be wearing the clothing of Ali (A) adhering to his practices.’[7]

-In another narration, Sufyan al-Thawri came to Abu Abdullah al-Sadiq (A), and saw him clad in bright white clothing, so he said, ‘This kind of clothing is not your type – what would the Messenger of Allah have worn?’ So Imam said, ‘…The Messenger of Allah lived in a time of poverty and drought. When the world (ie. its wealth) yields before you, the most deserving of people of it are the good before the corrupt, the believers before the hypocrites, and the Muslims before the infidels.’[8]

These legislative realities established by the contents of these lofty narrations demonstrate the extent of the effect of time and place on rulings, and that adherence to them is inevitable, and that in fact we must filter the narrative texts of the Sunnah through them regardless, for the noble Sunnah is analogous to the Qur’an in that it is alive and does not die, and that its forms and scopes of application continue to apply, be it as established practices or as corroborative source material.

This fact takes into account the renewal of individual instances, and not just their repetition over time. It entails taking the element of time into consideration, and including it as a factor in re-evaluating the religious text. This does not mean imposing new wordings to the same text, as some people may imagine. Rather it already has relevance, restricting it to the wordings within the subject matter of the ruling. However, there are people who say that time and place have absolutely no bearing as far as laws prescribing acts of worship (ʿibādāt) are concerned. The reason for this is that none of the individual acts that come under the heading of ‘worship’ can be subject to common convention (ʿurf), whereas laws to do with societal interactions (muʿāmalāt) can, and so the factors of time and place can be admissible here, because the individual instances are subject to common convention.

To further clarify this opinion, lets divide the spheres that legal rulings deal with, into three categories:

1)acts of worship

2)societal interactions


First we come to acts of worship:

All juristic opinions agree that the essential bases of acts of worship are not evident for humans, and nor is it possible for anyone to discover the essential bases for legal rulings in this category. So even when some texts indicate the philosophy behind a particular ruling or the reason for it, it is simply suggesting the wisdom behind that ruling, and perhaps part of the reason for it, but not the complete reasoning or comprehensive basis for it.

Further clarification:

The designation of an individual subject matter within the category of ‘acts of worship’ as a matter of fact and truth is the duty of the Lawgiver. What this means is that the jurist takes the command from the text, and extrapolates the ruling from the legal sources. He uses whatever he gleans from the source text to define the subject matter, just as he has to know the language of the source text in order to define the subject matter.

Lets take the prescribed daily prayer (salat) , for example.

Here we notice that all of its components are linked to the Lawgiver and have nothing whatsoever to do with common convention. So even if common convention were to rule with full certitude, for example, that the action carried out by a certain individual constitutes salat whilst the jurist ruled, according to the measures at his disposal, that this is not salat, then the jurist would be in the right. And if the opposite were to occur, where common convention ruled that an individual’s performance of the act was not salat, and a jurist ruled that it was, then it is the jurist’s stance that is taken, because he is the expert in this arena.

His eminence Sayyid al-Haydari, however, considers that individual acts of worship are a collective sum of various components, conditions and impediments, and that to start off with, it is paramount to look at the era of legislation and examine whether the Prophet (S), when he was applying these rulings, was he taking the geographical location of the region into consideration or not? The Arabian Peninsula, as regards its geographical location, experiences all four seasons distinctly, and day and night too whereby a typical day starts from dawn and ends with nightfall. There is a consecutive equilibrium between the timings, even in winter and summer. It is a given fact that the daily prayer, fasting, hajj, and many other acts of worship, let alone societal interactions, are directly linked to time, and in fact the obligation to perform them may well be attached to the effectualization of certain times.

So the daily prayer (salat) has prescribed numbers of units, rulings, conditions, timings, impediments, etc. So as regards timings, for example, it says in the Noble Qur’an: “So perform the regular prayers in the period from the time the sun is past its zenith till the darkness of the night, and [recite] the Qur’an at dawn – dawn recitation is always witnessed” (17:78) and: “keep up the prayer at both ends of the day, and during parts of the night” (11:118).

As regards the number of units in each prayer, however, a jurist cannot just come and say that the dawn prayer consists of three units. But the question that we must ask here is: When does the time for the dawn prayer set in, and who is to define it? If someone lives in a place that does not experience the alternation of night and day for months at a time, when does he pray and how? Knowing that the timings in every era are affected by the place in question, we need to know the ruling governing these particularities, irrespective of the specifics of other geographical locations, since we are people of this particular time and place.

To give another example, the redness in the sky at sunrise and sunset are linked to the distinguished recommendation to perform certain daily prayers at that time. So towns that do not experience this phenomenon of redness in the sky, who is it that defines when this distinguished time for the prayer is? In this case, it is imperative for the jurist to interpret the data at his disposal in order to define the regular and distinguished timings of the prayer and the rulings pertaining to them. This can only be done by consulting experts in those particular countries, who can help them define the timings of the prayer in a way that corresponds appropriately to their geographical location.

Similarly, for fasting – an act of worship incumbent upon the legally responsible Muslim (mukallaf) when certain conditions have been met and certain impediments lifted, as elaborated in the jurists’ compendia of practical laws. Our discussion today will deal with some of these conditions. So it is an act of worship that is observed over a number of days constituting the month of Ramadan:

“It was in the month of Ramadan that the Qur’an was revealed as guidance for mankind, clear messages giving guidance and distinguishing between right and wrong. So any one of you who is present that month should fast” (2:185)

It has specific timings defined for its observance, where the fast begins from true dawn until nightfall:

“eat and drink until the white thread of dawn becomes distinct from the black. Then fast until nightfall.” (2:187)

It also has concessions:

“and anyone who is ill or on a journey should make up for the lost days by fasting on other days later. God wants ease for you, not hardship. He wants you to complete the prescribed period” (2:185)

When we come to the legislation of fasting, we ask ourselves: Did the Prophet (S) observe it in adherence to the time and geographical location or not? In other words, is it a legislation whose application relies more or less on time? And did the elucidator of this law (peace and blessings be upon him) rely on daily naturally occurring phenomena to determine the timing for the beginning and end of this act of worship, or not?

In answer to these questions, we see that the Qur’anic verses quoted above themselves certify to us that the time for the start of the fast was from true dawn, terminating at the start of nightfall, so this was defined as a full day as far as the legislation for fasting was concerned.

The question that arises here is: if a person lives in a place where there is no typical day with natural phenomena signaling daytime and nighttime, unlike the region where revelation and legislation took place, what does he do? How does he fast and what timings does he adhere to? A natural day during the time when the legislation for fasting was established in the Arabian Peninsula about 1432 years ago, was about the same as what we see in the Middle East today – night and day, with twilight and dawn, redness in the sky and afternoon. All these natural phenomena would be evidences of the night and the day.

We noted previously that the Prophet (S) observed these acts of worship in adherence to the daily natural phenomena. However, many regions in the West are such that these natural phenomena almost never occur in a day and a night, as they do in the Arabian Peninsula, so how do we go about defining a shar’i (legal) day in order to be able to fast according to the blessed verse which commands: “eat and drink until the white thread of dawn becomes distinct from the black. Then fast until nightfall.” (2:187). And when do we break our fast, since there is no nightfall to signal the end of the fast? There are specifically some regions in the western world, where in summer, daylight prevails from sunset to sunrise, with no darkness experienced in between, and this absence of night is confirmed by astronomical research and observatories, for many towns in the northernmost part of the globe. So who is to define a ‘fasting day’ for us, and how one would fast and when? Can the legally competent Muslim (mukallaf) in such situations start and stop fasting according to his own personal judgment, or according to neighboring countries daytimes, as some jurists rule?

This theory also has relevance when we look at the subject of travelling during the month of Ramadan. Was the concession made by the Lawgiver in consideration of the resulting hardship that the ill person and the traveler would face, or not? The traveler in the era of legislation faced great difficulty and hardship in reaching his destination, and in fact, it would take him days and months to cover distances which today would take barely a few hours. With the development of modern modes of transport, and specifically aviation, we are now able to travel quite easily to other countries, as opposed to: “lands you could not reach without great hardship” (16:7). So is a traveller who does not undergo any hardship allowed to fast or not?

“Fast for a specific number of days, but if one of you is ill, or on a journey, on other days later. For those who can fast only with extreme difficulty, there is a way to compensate– feed a needy person. But if anyone does good of his own accord, it is better for him, and fasting is better for you, if only you knew.” (2:184)

This is where the role of a religious authority (marja’) who believes in the relevance of time and place as factors in the understanding of the religious text and the contexts wherein these laws applied, becomes obvious; in order that he can find solutions to these issues. Hence, his eminence Sayyid Kamal al-Haydari believes that it is paramount to produce a new system for fasting, where the following factors are taken into consideration:

1)To put in place a framework for fasting that corresponds to the geographical location where Muslims reside. The particularities of time and place therein should be studied thoroughly with due consideration for defining timings for everything.

2)The social element for Muslims in these regions must be taken into account, in order to enable them to observe this act of worship in its social dimension as well as its defined timings for every region, where all the inhabitants of a particular town would start and stop fasting at one specific time, not that the father and mother start at one time, and the children at another.

3)That this ruling is a ruling applicable specifically to Muslims in those particular localities. We cannot tell someone to fast as people in Mecca or Karbala or neighbouring countries fast, for those are actualities that have nothing to do with him, but for other people living in those particular geographical locations. These rulings need not be subject to or respective of the principle of taking the ‘most precautious’ course of action.

4)Due attention must be given to the issue of moon sighting, and the importance that it holds in determining the start of the lunar months, especially Ramadan and Shawwal, in order to address the problems that these issues have caused in the social reality of Muslims in all countries as we see happening today, and especially in western countries, where a single family may well start fasting on three separate days in Ramadan, and celebrate three different days of Eid – why? This is because the father follows one Marja’ who holds the opinion of the unity of horizons, whereas the mother follows another Marja’ who believes in multiple horizons, and the children follow the same Marja’ but reside in a different location, to complicate matters even further. Then comes the issue of sighting the moon itself – should it only be sighted with the naked eye? Or can it be with an aid? Can modern scientific methods of calculation, which have reached very advanced stages of development, be used to determine the new moon?

This is again where the role of a religious authority, well-acquainted with his own era, undaunted by ambiguities becomes very obvious. And this is possible with an all-comprehensive, objective view of religion (not a subjective one), as held by Sayyid al-Haydari (may he live long), where he takes into consideration the social dimension of many acts of worship which Allah has designed to be unifying. So Eid, according to him, should be one day for all the countries in one particular part of the world, even if the night has passed. The Muslim community as a whole must experience it, as the supplication (reported in hadith) goes: “I ask You for the sake of this day, which You have designated as an Eid for the Muslims.”

Here, we would also like to point out certain offshoots of this discussion based on the relevance of this theory to the issue of following (taqlid) a dead Marja’, be it from the outset or remaining on his taqlid post-mortem. Based on the current taqlidi approach, there will remain no evidence to support a prohibition of following a dead Marja’, because the objective is to understand what is present in the narrations and the verses of the Qur’an in detail. Time and place have absolutely no bearing in determining the sphere of application of the various subject matters for the rulings and in the process of juristic investigation. This is in direct contrast to if we were to stipulate the relevance of time as a factor. Based on this, it will not be permissible to follow a dead Marja’, neither on the outset nor remaining on his taqlid post-mortem.

The point is clear in this regard, and the same ruling goes for the issue of following the most knowledgeable jurist (a’lam). So someone who was the most knowledgeable a decade or two ago cannot be the most knowledgeable now, due to the same points mentioned above. This clarifies for us, therefore, the sheer extent of how much relevance time and place have in the process of deriving legal rulings, and how up-to-date the jurist executing this process has to be. Imam al-Sadiq, peace be upon him, has said: “The one who well-acquainted with his own era is undaunted by ambiguities.’[9]

There are other rulings, which we shall discuss in detail at a later time, as well as the details of the theory of the relevance of time and place, in defining the necessary scope of application in religion, what is fixed and what is prone to change in Shari’a.

The sections on social interactions and politics will also be dealt with at a later time.


The conclusions and results drawn from the theory of the relevance of time and place can be summed up as follows:

1)The rulings that the jurist issues are not exceptions to the primary rule, but the legal ruling itself, because the idea of an exceptional circumstance gives man a dimension of self-interest therein, as in this is an exception and not the legal ruling itself. However, according to this theory of the relevance of time and place, the ruling issued is the legally-binding ruling, with a change in the subject matter. It is not an exception to the primary ruling.

2)This theory takes the jurist out of the state of mere research into the traditions and subjects that the narrations deal with, and into the sphere of contact with society at large, social reality, and the contexts that he issues rulings for (taking into consideration the social dimension to acts of worship).

3)It gives the societal dimension a very important role within the process of legislation and extrapolation of legal rulings. This is what Shahid al-Sadr used to emphasise repeatedly, that our jurisprudence is individualistic and not social, as in it does not take the societal dimension into account.

4)The theory of the relevance of time and space deals with the subject matters of legal rulings, so a change in rulings is actually just a case of a change in subject matters. Hence we can say that rulings change in accordance with contexts and the changes occurring within those subject matters.

5)The theory of relevance of time and place considers the fact that local timings in places where Muslims reside do have a bearing on defining the nature of acts of worship, and the extent and scope of their observance, especially as regards the daily prayer and fasting.

6)The theory of time and place is relevant to the understanding of many complicated issues, even so far as defining and observing many dogmatic issues.

This was a summary of the discussion entitled: ‘The relevance of time and space in religious interpretation according to Sayyid Kamal al-Haydari.’

Note: Sayyid Kamal al-Haydari has three books – write-ups of his research linked to our discussion on this subject:

1)Outlines of Juristic Revival (Ma’alim al-Tajdid al-Fiqhi)

2)The Fixed and the Changing in Religious Learning (al-Thabit wa al-Mutaghayyir Fi al-Ma’rifa al-Diniyya)

3)al-Allama al-Haydari’s Juristic Approach (al-Manhaj al-Fiqhi lil Allam al-Haydari)

All praise belongs to Allah.

by al-Shaykh Mushtaq al-Khaqani,


Allah is the guardian of all success and from Him do we seek assistance.

[1] al-Shaykh al-Kulayni, al-Kafi, Dar al-Hadith, v.1, p.151)

[2] Do No Harm; Accept No Harm from the works of Grand Ayatullah Sayyid Shahid Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr, authored by Sayyid Kamal al-Haydari, Dar Faraqid, 2nded. 1423 AH, p.59

[3] Muḥammad ibn Masʿūd ibn ʿAyyāsh al-Salamī, Tafsīr al-ʿAyyāshī, edited by Sayyid Hishām al-Rasūlī, Tehran: al-Maktabat al-ʿIlmiyya al-Islāmiyya, v.2, p.204

[4] al-Shaykh Muḥammad ibn Yaʿqūb al-Kulaynī, Uṣūl al-Kāfī, edited by ʿAlī Akbar al-Ghaffārī, Dar al-Hadith, v.1, p.156

[5] al-Hurr al-Amili, Wasa’il al-Shi’a, v.27, p.62

[6] Wasa’il al-Shi’a, v.29, p.201-202

[7] al-Kafi, v.1, p.411


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